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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on two types of licenses that can best be 
described as outliers—FRAND and compulsory licenses. 
Overall, these two specific forms of licenses share the objective 
of producing a fair and reasonable license of a technology 
protected by intellectual property. The comparable objective 
notwithstanding, each type of license achieves this end using 
different mechanisms. The FRAND license emphasizes providing 
the licensee with reasonable terms, e.g., by preventing a 
standard patent holder from extracting unreasonably high 
royalty rates.  By contrast, compulsory licenses emphasize the 
public benefit that flows from enabling access to an otherwise 
inaccessible invention. Ultimately, both forms of license attempt 
to create a value for the licensed product that can be remarkably 
different from the product’s true market value.  Nevertheless, 
both forms ultimately benefit the end-consumer who pays less to 
access a product subject to either of these forms of license. In 
comparing these two forms of licenses, the paper hopes to 
determine whether one form is better than the other, and if so, 
from whose perspective—the consumer, the licensor or the 
licensee. In doing so, this paper compares the different 
prevailing efforts to embrace such licenses as well as the impact 
of such licenses on the industry.  
INTRODUCTION 
Licenses are specific forms of contract structured as legal tools 
detailing the terms of a bargain to either gain or give away rights in 
exchange for other interests or obligations. Licenses are used in different 
situations and for using different technologies to create and define rights 
of the involved parties. Typically, a license agreement is a by-product of 
a bargain or negotiation between the parties. Contemporary licenses, 
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which are also structured as permits, determine specified activities or 
create rights that would otherwise not be possible for the licensee. 
Corporations use licenses as a mechanism to standardize terms and 
conditions between vendors, consumers, competitors and other interested 
parties. Thus, the objective of any license is to memorialize the terms 
between parties—a fair license merely reflects the equal bargaining 
power of the parties. 
This paper specifically focuses on two types of licenses that can 
best be described as outliers—FRAND and compulsory licenses. The 
term FRAND is an acronym for “Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory,” which, in essence, signifies such features’ presence in 
the license. The distinguishing feature of a FRAND license is that it is a 
voluntary commitment by the licensor to negotiate “fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory” terms.1 On the other hand, compulsory licenses, as 
“involuntary contract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller 
imposed and enforced by the state,”2 force the licensor to enter into a 
license arrangement. Thus, compulsory licenses can affect market 
exclusivity (as new licensees enter the market) and thus, the market price 
of the licensed product.3 Overall, these two specific forms of licenses are 
outliers because both share the objective to produce a fair and reasonable 
license of a technology protected by intellectual property. Despite the 
comparable objective in FRAND and compulsory licenses, each type of 
license achieves this end using different mechanisms. The FRAND 
license emphasizes providing the licensee with reasonable terms, e.g., by 
preventing a standard patent holder from extracting unreasonably high 
royalty rates.  By contrast, compulsory licenses emphasize the public 
benefit that flows from enabling access to an otherwise inaccessible 
invention. The term “fair and reasonable” takes on a slightly different 
meaning, depending on the type of license involved. While a product’s 
economic value is an important consideration for both license types, in 
order to issue a compulsory license, the public’s need for the product and 
failure to obtain a license under reasonable commercial terms remain 
important considerations. Both forms of license attempt to create a value 
                                                
1 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).  
2 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The 
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349 (1993) (quoting PAUL K. 
GORECKI, ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REGULATING THE PRICE OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRODUCT 
SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMMES (1981)). 
3 See Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The 
Supreme Court in Pharma v. Walsh and the Trips Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 777, 782 (2004). 
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for the licensed product that can be remarkably different from the 
product’s true market value.  Nevertheless, both forms ultimately benefit 
the end-consumer who pays less to access a product subject to either of 
these forms of license.  
This paper attempts to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of such end-based licenses. The objective of this exercise 
is to determine whether one form is better than the other, and if so, from 
whose perspective—the consumer, the licensor or the licensee. In doing 
so, this paper compares the different prevailing efforts to embrace one 
form or the other outside of the United States.  
With the above background, Part I of this paper outlines what 
FRAND licenses are, how they are deployed by the industry, and 
discusses the prevailing issues concerning these licenses. Part II 
highlights what compulsory licenses are and their role in securing access 
to technology. Part III compares the two forms of licenses to determine 
whether one form is superior to the other in their ability to achieving the 
objectives of the system. The conclusion highlights a future course of 
action to structure licenses that combine the best attributes of both forms 
to achieve the objectives of the system, i.e., providing access to 
technology and to the progress of science. 
I. THE FRAND LICENSE 
The FRAND licenses and the operational challenges they present 
are best understood from the use of such licenses in the software 
industry. In fact, the proliferation of software patents is an issue that has 
been the subject of much debate recently.4 Information and 
communications technology (ICT) patents can be best represented as a 
myriad of overlapping “patent thickets.” An interested party must 
navigate these patent thickets to commercialize the technology covered 
by such patents.5 Indeed, Adam Jaffe defines it as "an overlapping set of 
                                                
4 See generally Andrés Guadamuz González, The Software Patent Debate, 
JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC., 1 (Jan. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_unido_smes_msk_07/wipo_uni
do_smes_msk_07_www_73624.pdf; Rosa Maria Ballardini, The Software 
Patent Thicket: A Matter of Disclosure, 6:2 SCRIPTed 207, 221 (2009), 
available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol6-2/ballardini.pdf; 
Eugenia Georgiades, Falling Through the Cracks: The Problem of 
Granting Software Patents, 7:3 SCRIPTed 474, 475 (2010), available at 
http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-3/georgiades.pdf.  
5 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119 (2000), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25056143.  
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patent rights” which causes interested licensees to obtain licenses on 
several patents from multiple sources.6 Patent holders and potential 
licensees have found them difficult to navigate for two reasons: the 
prevalence of several patents, and the need for compatibility between 
products. The need for compatibility is commonly called “product 
interoperability,” which describes the ability of two or more products to 
work with each other smoothly.7  
Products involving the ICT technology are typically covered by 
several patents that must allow the products to be interoperable to create 
the desired outcome. Contemporary ICT products are generally covered 
by multiple patents from various inventors working together on a 
common platform. For example, in the mobile phone and cellular 
network industry, the phones are not actually connected with one 
another. Rather, cellular networks provide the connectivity by 
transferring data between two (or more) handsets. For this purpose, 
cellular networks must conform to established industry standards. One 
such standard is the fourth generation long-term evolution (4G LTE) 
network.8 Such established standards facilitate interoperability – or, 
compatibility between products. Thus, interoperability is not merely a 
user-friendly mechanism, but can also reduce costs because it is simpler 
for phone companies to acquire technical and design information 
pertaining to the networks when there is a standard in place. 
Interoperability typically results in each technology being covered by 
several patents – some, if not all, of which is essential to the further 
development of the technology.  In many cases these patents overlap 
making it difficult for a single patent owner would find it difficult to 
operate in a space delineated from other, often competing patents. 
Sometimes, patents may read on each other’s products or processes, 
thereby necessitating cross-licensing and resulting in both owners 
competing in the same market. Realizing the interdependence of 
competition and its importance to their businesses, patent owners whose 
patents deal with standards that bear interoperable features can have such 
patents designated as a standard. Specifically, patent owners may submit 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 See URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS: 
WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 4 
 (2007), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop- 
breaking-barriers.pdf (defining information and communications technologies 
interoperability as “the ability to transfer and render useful data and other useful 
information across systems . . . applications, or components”). 
8 See generally Stephan Dorn, Who Owns LTE Patents?, IPEG, 
http://www.ipeg.com/who-owns-lte-patents/ (last visited June 4, 2015). 
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such a patent to a standards-setting organizations (“SSO”),9 which can 
elevate its designation to that of a standards-essential patent (“SEP”), 
subject to the patent meeting the qualifying requirements. Further, at the 
time of submission of the patent, the SSOs require the patent owner to 
agree to standard declarations or commitments.10  As part of the 
commitments, the patent owner makes the patent available for licensing 
on FRAND terms if it is elevated as a standard.  
The following part discusses the process of FRAND licensing 
with particular emphasis on issues that affect the patent owners and the 
industry from the SEPs. This discussion begins with an introduction to 
SSOs, outlines the issues they face with the FRAND licenses, and ends 
with a discussion of the available remedies while specifically 
highlighting the unresolved issues therefrom. 
A. Introduction to SSOs 
SSOs are industry groups that set common standards in 
significant areas of invention to facilitate mediation between intellectual 
property (“IP”) owners and users.11 A standard is a set of technical 
specifications providing for a common design for a product or process.12  
As such, the SSOs are essentially membership organizations to which 
leaders of that particular industry belong. For instance, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the world’s largest 
international standard development organization.13 Other independent 
standard setting organizations like the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) publish standards and aim to foster “technological innovation and 
excellence for the benefit of humanity.”14  
                                                
9 These are also known as standards-developing organizations (“SDOs”). 
10 David Long, Federal Circuit Gives Guidance on Litigating RAND 
Royalty (Ericsson v. D-Link), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/12/federal-circuit-gives-guidance-on-
litigating-rand-obligation-ericsson-v-d-link/. 
11 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights & Standards-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002).  
12 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8 (2008). 
13 About ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited June 4, 
2015). 
14 IEEE’s Mission & Vision, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/about/vision_ 
mission.html (last visited June 4, 2015); Mission Statement, IETF, 
 http://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html (last visited June 4, 2015). 
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Standards tend to harmonize various operational aspects of the 
industry, and thus create a broad, uniform platform to interact 
effectively. For example, when an industry in Timbuktu is certified by 
the ISO for accounting practices, it signifies conformance to certain 
practices that are the norm to the accounting industry in the rest of the 
world. In a globalized world, standards evolve into a language distinct to 
a particular industry and set a minimum bar. Thus, for industries located 
in different parts of the world, conformity to standards can be status 
defining, and thus help to create business opportunities.  
When SSOs set standards, they take the form of a set of technical 
specifications that provide, or attempt to provide, a common design for a 
product or process in a given sector.15 If a standard cannot be 
implemented without infringing on a particular patent, then that patent is 
said to be standards-essential.16 When the SSOs declare a standard, 
companies owning patents covering the standard should declare the 
patent, especially if they have participated in the standards setting 
process.17 Where the patent covers an essential aspect of that standard, 
the patent owner may enter into negotiations with the SSO to adopt the 
patent as a SEP. If it is designated a SEP, the patent owner can license it 
for free or for a reasonable royalty rate to implementers of the standard. 
Otherwise, the owner could refuse to license its SEPs forcing the SSO to 
design its standards around the patents.  
Generally, it is in the patent owners’ best interest to have their 
patents adopted as a standard. The reasons are explained in-depth later in 
this article. In short, this is because an SSO’s licensing terms greatly 
increase the market power of a standards-essential patent, which is 
appealing to patent owners in the standards-setting environment. 
Notably, outside the SSO framework, many of these standards essential 
                                                
15 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PATENT CHALLENGES 
FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 31–50 (2013). 
16 See JANICE M. MUELLER, POTENTIAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY BASED ON A 
PATENT OWNER’S MANIPULATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS SETTING 
36 (2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-
exemc/pdf/liability.pdf.  
17 See Andrew Updegrove, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
FRAND (But Didn’t Know Who to Ask), CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=2012022107482
6486 (“Standards setting organizations (SSOs) require those that help create a 
standard (and sometimes all of the members of the SSO) to state before a 
standard is approved for implementation whether they have any patent claims 
that would be unavoidably infringed by someone implementing the standard . . . 
.”).  
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patents will likely compete with one another. The SSO framework 
minimizes issues related to delay on product manufacturing that result 
from competition between patent owners.18 The SSO framework is also 
meant to function to minimize patent hold-up, a situation where the 
patent owner can delay the product development by demanding 
unreasonable or discriminatory royalties after a patent becomes a widely 
adopted standard. 19 The alternative for the patent owner failing to 
negotiate an agreement with the SSO, is to enter into licensing 
agreements with interested licensees individually or not to license the 
patent at all.  
In negotiations that involve adopting a patent as an SEP, the 
rules of the SSO define the licensing terms. SSOs can sometimes require 
licensing assurances, or a disclaimer specifying that claims of an SEP 
will not be enforced against members.20 The SSO policies generally 
specify that SEPs must be licensed on “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory,” or FRAND terms.21 For example, the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a SSO for the 
telecommunications industry in Europe.22 The ETSI has an outlined 
procedure for adopting patents as standards. Where a patent owner 
believes itself to hold essential patents with regards to an ETSI standard, 
e.g. the 4G and 4G LTE cellular networks, the ETSI provides a licensing 
                                                
18 See Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the 
Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., 
1, 2-3 (Mar. 2013), available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational. 
com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Special.pdf (explaining that SSOs could 
set up policies that would limit hold-up more effectively). 
19 Andy Updegrove, FTC Seeks Input on Patent Holdup in 
Standards Development, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (May 16, 2011), http://www. 
consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=20110514112823379. 
20 Nutter McClennen & Fish LLP, What Does Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory Mean, Anyway?, LEXOLOGY (May 22, 2013), http://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bf462132-5ec3-4b41-a7ab-52e27236a8ab. 
21 See generally European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI 
DIRECTIVES 36 (2013), available at http://portal.etsi.org/directives/home.asp; 
see also ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Policy, 
2014 at 6.1 (“When an essential IPR relating to a particular standard or technical 
specification is brought to the attention of the ETSI, the Director-General of 
ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within three months an 
irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable 
licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and 
conditions under such IPR . . . .”). Generally, an entity that joins an SSO does so 
voluntarily; however, it is (usually) obligatory that the joining entity agree to 
license their patents on FRAND terms. See id.  
22  About ETSI, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/about (last visited June 20, 2015).  
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declaration form to be completed by the patent owner.23 The declaration 
form includes a general undertaking that the patent owner will license its 
patents under FRAND terms and conditions, so long as these patents are, 
or become, essential to a new or existing ETSI standard. Once the patent 
owner completes the licensing formalities, the patents become standards-
essential subject to other qualifying requirements. Consequently, the 
owner may either become an institute member or simply a third party 
affiliated to the ETSI, each entailing certain rights under the ETSI 
Policy.24 
B. The Mechanism of FRAND Licensing 
Essentially, the FRAND licensing mechanism enables users of 
an SEP to negotiate and pay a royalty to a patent owner who has already 
undertaken to be reasonable and fair to the SSO when the patent was 
designated an SEP 25 At its core, FRAND licensing should offer the same 
or similar terms to all users or licensees (sometimes called “developers”) 
on a given patent. This is meant to minimize or prevent licensing abuses 
and post-standardization hold-ups by the patent owner, such as refusing 
to license the patent or setting exorbitant royalty rates.26  
Notably, while the general requirement is to be fair and 
reasonable, these terms are left undefined. Hence, one of the most 
difficult issues that pervades this area relates to the definitions of the 
                                                
23 See ETSI Rules of Procedure, supra note 21, at 6bis (“MEMBERS shall use 
one of the ETSI IPR Licensing Declaration Forms . . . to make their IPR 
licensing declarations.”); see also Internet Engineering Task Force, The Internet 
Standards Process I, 10.3.2(C) (1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt 
(noting that “[w]here the IESG knows of rights, … the IETF Executive Director 
shall attempt to obtain from the claimant of such rights, a written assurance that 
upon approval by the IESG of the relevant Internet standards track 
specification(s), any party will be able to obtain the right to implement, use and 
distribute the technology or works when implementing, using or distributing 
technology based upon the specific specification(s) under openly specified, 
reasonable, nondiscriminatoryterms”). 
24 See Updegrove, supra note 17.  
25 See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of 
Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 624 (2002). 
26 See Jonathan Radcliffe & Gillian Sproul, FRAND and 
the Smartphone Wars, INTELL. PROP. MAG., 45–46 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/Files/Publication/477a076f-dd7e-408c-8321-
64edf33c190e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5b202a76-bc80-4467-b286-
7a3b8e90e06d/Frand_Smartphone_Sproul.pdf (discussing how FRAND licenses 
impact competition in the smart-phone market).  
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FRAND terms.27 Generally, the term “fair” relates to the underlying 
licensing terms, and describes them as not being anti-competitive, and 
not unlawful.28 Similarly, the term “reasonable” relates to licensing rates 
that do not result in unreasonable aggregate rates.29  A negotiations for 
reasonable royalty rate, for instance, tends to be based on several factors 
most of which would be hypothetical at the point of negotiation and it 
ought to reflect consideration to factors such as the presence of patents 
held by others, competition (ex ante), technological alternatives, ability 
of the industry to evolve newer alternatives, the need and ability of the 
technology to cater to product interoperability requirements and such.30  
Thus, reasonableness is computed based on several factors 
including the value of the patent pre and post standardization. 
Nevertheless, negotiating a reasonable royalty rate will not only help the 
licensee but should also address to mitigate serious industry problems 
like royalty-stacking, which happens when  a product potentially 
involves or infringes many patents, and hence, bears multiple royalty 
                                                
27 Id. at 45; see also Kesan & Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent 
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 239 (2014) (“One of 
the most pervasive issues in the SSO context is that FRAND is rarely if ever 
defined in advance of a conflict.”); Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, 
 Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary Commitment to 
License Essential Patens on “Fair and Reasonable” Terms, SOC. 
SCI. RES. NETWORK, Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.cravath.com 
/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3233990_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
28 See, e.g., Saumya Srivastava, Standard Essential Patents and Competition 
Law, COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA, 15–16 (2013) (noting that “fair” 
terms refrain from “bundling” (whereby buyers purchase several products as one 
combined product on more advantageous terms), from providing free grant 
backs (by which the licensor can incorporate the improvements of the licensee’s 
R&D in its own products free of charge), and from granting mandatory 
exclusivity agreements (which outline the grounds for the exclusion of an entity 
from practicing the IP or patent rights of a given product, or from practicing the 
standard of an SSO)).  
29 See Radcliffe & Sproul, supra note 26, at 46 (asserting that reasonable royalty 
would be close to the sum that parties would have reached in a hypothetical 
arms-length negotiation); cf. Srivatsava, supra note 28 (explaining that 
“reasonable” is a controversial matter when defining RAND terms due to the 
difficulty in deciding whether effects from the technology’s wide use in light of 
SSO adoption should be factored into its value). 
30 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting 
Reasonable Royalties for Standards-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1146–49 (2013), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/frand.pdf.  
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burdens.31 The reference to “non-discriminatory” terms also relate to the 
underlying licensing condition (rates and terms). This requirement is 
meant to ensure that new entrants to the market are free to enter into 
licensing relationship on the same basis as existing competitors, which 
will help to maintain a level playing field in the industry. In other words, 
a “non-discriminatory” clause should ensure that, a licensor’s rates and 
terms must be the same for all licensees. In every case, it is the licensor’s 
responsibility to ensure that every potential licensee receives the same 
FRAND contract. Additionally patent owners generally tend to grant 
users the rights to implement the standard of the SSO in their products 
along with other patents declared “essential” or “necessary” by the 
SSO.32  
Importantly, patent owners who agree to make their patents SEPs 
and make them available on FRAND terms enjoy several benefits. For 
instance, they can influence the technological development of a 
standard.33 Members of the SSO, particularly those who are also patent 
owners,  are positioned to influence not only the technical aspect of the 
standards but also strategic aspects such as identifying areas where 
standards will be created, the order of prioritization for standards 
creation, and the ends or markets that these standards will serve. This 
results in considerable authority over the development of the future 
standards and become influential in the industry. 34 Other benefits from 
FRAND licensing include certification and branding for standards-
compliant products, which may further result in both shared costs and 
early access to information regarding a related but evolving standard.35 
By agreeing to license its SEPs on FRAND terms, however, the 
patent owner forfeits certain rights. The patent owner cannot block 
                                                
31Id at 1149, 1150; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf (discussing issues and 
problems that arise in working reasonable royalties and highlighting the courts 
responses to such problems). 
32 See ETSI, supra note 23; John Cassels, UK: What is FRAND?, MONDAQ.COM 
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/x/260184/Patent/What+Is+FRAND 
(noting that when licensees are discriminated, there should be an objective 
reason for doing so).  
33 Andrew Updegrove, The Essential Guide to Standards, 
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/particip 
ating1.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
34 See id (“Those that participate in the governing bodies of SSOs decide which 
standards will be created, in what order, and to serve what purposes.”).  
35 Id. 
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implementation of a standard by licensing at exorbitant prices.36 
Additionally, the owner cannot prevent noncompliant implementation of 
the standard. They are, however, able to sue and seek an injunction in the 
event of such implementation.37 Similarly, restricted disagreements over 
the terms of the FRAND commitment cannot serve as an excuse for 
patent owners to refuse to license or to disclose the patents.38 Any refusal 
to license could be treated as a violation of the agreement with the SSO, 
constituting a breach of the patent owner’s contract.39 And refusal by the 
patent owner to adhere to the negotiated terms with licensees or to 
disclose the patent will also be subject to contractual remedies.40  
Ultimately, FRAND licenses are third party contracts involving 
patent rights. Therefore, the patent owner’s refusal to license can cause 
the potential licensee to sue the owner as a third party beneficiary 
without affecting the SSO’s separate claim against the owner for a 
breach of contract claim. The contract claim arises from the fact that a 
patent holder voluntarily submits to the SSO’s licensing policy, which 
typically include a commitment to license in FRAND terms, thus 
creating an enforceable contract.41 Indeed, where the patent owner 
accuses a third party of infringement, the accused can defend the 
infringement suit on the grounds that the patent was not offered on fair 
and reasonable terms.  Similarly, the licensee -the implementer of the 
standards – can offensively sue the patent owner because the agreement 
does not conform to FRAND terms. These are very different situations. 
                                                
36 See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing 
the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. OF IT STANDARDS AND 
STANDARIZATION RES. 1, 2 (2011) (explaining that under FRAND terms a 
patent holder must not charge more than “the incremental value of his invention 
over the next best technical alternative”). 
37 See Jonathan Radcliffe & Gillian Sproul, FRAND and the smartphone wars, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE, 47 (Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012) (explaining a 
permanent injunction on noncompliant implementation may be granted after 
succeeding at trial if there is “any sign of equivocation by the competitor that it 
will not pay FRAND royalties”). 
38 See Brooks, supra note 36, at 11 (“In agreeing to license on FRAND terms, 
the IP owner has not agreed to constrain its licensing terms more tightly than the 
‘range of reasonableness.’”). 
39 See id. (explaining that in the event of disagreement over terms, the 
implementer could “seek a determination through breach of contract action that 
FRAND terms have not been offered”).  
40 See id. (“[I]f an offer has been made and refused, then the only contractual 
question to be adjudicated is whether the terms offered . . . fall outside the range 
of reasonableness contemplated by the FRAND commitment.”).  
41 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1991–96. 
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As to the first scenario, the licensee’s position relative to the SSO 
enables him to seek FRAND terms in the capacity of the intended 
beneficiary of the patent owner and the SSO’s agreement with the SSO.42 
As for the second, the patent licensee asserts a breach of contract on the 
grounds that the patent was not offered on FRAND terms. Where the 
licensee asserts a breach of FRAND terms, the prevailing reasoning is 
that a FRAND licensee cannot “negotiate and sign a license, enjoy the 
benefit of that license for as long as it pleases, and then collaterally 
attack the license as unenforceable . . . on the theory that the license 
terms violated the preceding contractual commitment.”43 Importantly, the 
contractual nature of the FRAND commitment creates rights and 
obligations that work with the rights and obligations associated with the 
patent. As such, licensees are also bound by the FRAND agreement with 
the same amount of care as the patent owner.  
The FRAND agreements being enforceable contracts, suffer 
from the same benefits and detriments as that of every other contract.44 
The scope for potential disagreements and disputes from the contractual 
terms increases. For instance, while the patent owner undertakes with the 
SSO to negotiate reasonable royalties, questions such as what is 
reasonable, or, who determines whether a term is reasonableness are all 
subjective and hence, potentially contentious.  The differences in 
perceiving what a reasonable royalty is can lead to disputes and 
disagreements that block the effective use of the technology. Thus, the 
practical advice for potential licensees and patent owners is to thoroughly 
investigate the SSO’s bylaws before the technology is licensed.45 
However, in the event of a dispute, the confluence of contractual issues 
with the associated IP rights does provide diverse remedies, as discussed 
in detail later. Although it increases the parties’ options for remedies, it 
simultaneously creates issues that may undermine the flow of the 
arrangement’s intended benefits. The following section addresses some 
                                                
42 See generally Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to 
Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking and 
the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101 (2007). 
43 See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing 
the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. OF IT STANDARDS 
AND STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 12 (2011), available at http://www.cravath.com 
/files/uploads/documents/publications/3285864_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014).   
44 See id. 
45 See Kraig A Jakobsen, Revisiting Standard-Setting Organizations’ Patent 
Policies, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 50 (2004), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=102
7&context=njtip.  
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of the remedies available when there is a dispute over a FRAND 
commitment, with a view to highlight the various options and their 
associated issues.  
C. Available Remedies 
The above discussion highlighted that a FRAND license 
implicates patents licenses, the law of contracts, property laws and 
reliance interest. The choice of remedies available and that can be 
deployed in the event of a dispute over the FRAND agreements are best 
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on  the facts and 
circumstances of the situation. The discussion of the various remedies 
that have been used in FRAND disputes serves as a precursor to the 
subsequent section, which will question whether some of these issues are 
better dealt with by using compulsory licenses.  
1. Injunctive Relieve Under the Patent Statute 
The first form of remedy is for injunctive relief. A patent owner 
believing his SEP to be infringed can seek injunctive relief under Title 
35. 46 If a court denies the injunctive relief, it will cause the parties to 
renegotiate the terms, as in every other contract. The factors considered 
by a court in determining whether an injunction for the patent owner is 
warranted are outlined in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.47 The U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously opined that an injunction should not be 
automatically issued in every instance of alleged patent infringement.48 
In essence, the party filing for injunctive relief should show its 
entitlement to an injunction by providing evidence of four factors: (1) the 
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant warrants a remedy in equity; and (4) 
public interest will not be disserved by a permanent injunction.49 
In a standards-setting environment, especially considering the 
pace of the technology’s development, issuance of an injunction can tilt 
the balance towards the patent owner and create a hold-up problem. 
                                                
46 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952); see also JONES DAY, STANDARDS 
 ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, (2013), available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028- 
906e1297060b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b-
294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents.pdf.  
47 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
48 See id. at 392–93 (“[T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to 
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”). 
49 Id. at 391.   
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Specifically, an injunction in favor of the owner prevents the use and 
development of that technology and stalls further development over that 
technology. This forces potential licensees to the negotiating table while 
at the same time significantly increasing the bargaining power of the 
patent owner.50 Even though an injunction theoretically maintains the 
status quo in restraining one party from practicing another’s patent, when 
an SEP patent is involved, the availability of a guaranteed injunctive 
relief like in the pre-eBay era results in empowering patent-owners to use 
the threat of injunction to demand more royalties. Considering the high 
rate of product interoperability prevailing in the ICT sector, injunctions 
effectively either force renegotiations or ensure due dispensation of 
royalties.51 Basically, the guarantee of automatic injunctions for patent 
infringement empowers the patent owner to stall a competitor by 
strategically using the SEP. Thus, the biggest change with eBay is that by 
taking away the guaranteed injunctive relief in the event of an alleged 
infringement, it has made the field more equitable. Even the Federal 
Circuit, traditionally patent friendly, has arguably shown a tendency to 
be cautious when an SEP patent is involved.52 For instance, when 
considering whether Apple would suffer irreparable harm absent an 
injunction against Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus, the Court held that the 
patentee must establish that the claimed feature is the cause of consumer 
demand for the product being sold (“causal nexus”) in order to prove 
irreparable harm from a finding of loss of sales/market share for the 
product.53  That is, the court required that the causal nexus requirement 
should establish that the patentee is indeed harmed by the infringement.54  
                                                
50 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and 
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (hereinafter, Chien & 
Lemley) (discussing the effects of a threat of injunction). 
51 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE and U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIALPATENTS SUBJECT TO 
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 4 (2013) [hereinafter POLICY 
STATEMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994 
.pdf (explaining the patent-holdup problem). 
52 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374–75 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); but see Ericsson, Inc., v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F. 3d. 1201, 1227 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (favoring patentee in ruling that there is no set Georgia Pacific 
like factors for assessment of damages). 
53 Apple, 695 F.3d at 1374–75. 
54 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
see also Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the district court’s finding that Apple failed to show causal nexus 
between harm and patent infringement). 
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The eBay decision has important implications for SEP patents. In 
essence, the patent owner’s agreement with the SSO presumptively 
signifies the competitor’s need for the patent in exchange for a license on 
FRAND terms, thus implying that a provision of royalty or monetary 
damages would fit better than an injunction as an adequate remedy.55  
Indeed, when Motorola sought an injunction to prevent Apple from using 
its UMTS telecommunications capability on cell phones, Judge Posner 
refused to issue an injunction on the grounds that Apple cannot be 
enjoined from using the patent unless it refuses to pay a royalty on 
FRAND terms.56 The district court noted that Apple had not, as Motorola 
claimed, refused to pay for Motorola’s SEPs outright; Apple had only 
refused to pay more than what Motorola would charge any other 
potential licensee for its SEPs.57 The court reasoned that Motorola’s 
commitment to license its patents to anyone willing to pay FRAND 
royalties amounts to an acknowledgement that royalties would be an 
adequate remedy.58 Further, the court opined that an injunction would 
result in Motorola enjoying the benefits of the higher hold-up value 
generated by withholding the technology from Apple.59 The court 
specifically highlighted the harm that the resulting holding-up of SEP 
patents would cause to consumers.60 Basically, the court determined that 
SEP patent-owner plaintiffs cannot block potential licensees from using a 
SEP patent and indirectly, inflate its value.61 Further, the court added that 
a suit for declaratory relief in federal court should be entertained only if 
either the party or its opponent could bring a federal suit for injunctive or 
monetary relief. 
On appeal, a divided majority of a three member panel of the 
Federal Circuit agreed with Judge Posner and affirmed the denial of 
injunctive relief on the grounds that money damages are adequate 
compensation where an SEP patent is involved, but the court clarified 
                                                
55 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(refusing to enjoin infringement of the patent unless the infringer refuses to pay 
royalties). 
56 Id.  
57 Geoff Duncan, Judge Dismisses Apple-Motorola Cases with Prejudice, 
DIGITAL TRENDS, (June 24, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/judge-
dismisses-apple-motorola-cases-with-prejudice/.  
58 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 8, 9. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 16.  
61 Id. at 17.  
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that there was no per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs.62 
Thus, for FRAND licenses, injunction is not an automatic option but a 
remedy where the plaintiff can prove harm beyond failure of royalty 
negotiation.  
2. Breach of Contract 
The second form of remedy is for a breach of the FRAND 
contract. This form of remedy is most likely to be pursued by the 
licensee rather than the patent owner when, on account of a dispute, the 
licensee is unable to use the SEP.  That is, licensees of the SEPs, as third 
party beneficiaries, can sue the patent owner for the breach of FRAND 
contract involving the SEPs in question. Similarly, licensees, acting as 
“standard-users”—that is, a party using the SEPs in question in their 
products already— can use breach of contract as a mechanism to sue the 
patent owner and seek a remedy when they believe that the patent owner 
has breached the FRAND obligations. Such breach of contract suits may 
ensue even with potential licensees who are members of the SSO stand to 
lose when patent owners seemingly do not abide by their FRAND 
commitments.  For instance, in 2010, Motorola sent an offer to Microsoft 
outlining its willingness to license its patents that concerned the IEEE 
WiFi 802.11 (The Wifi or WLAN), which is the wireless networking 
SEP and ITU H.264, the video coding SEPs at a rate of 2.25% of the 
end-product price.63 The offer from Motorola prompted Microsoft, in 
November 2010, to file a complaint against Motorola alleging a breach 
of contract and seek a declaratory judgment on the grounds that Motorola 
failed to meet the FRAND commitments set by the IEEE on account of 
having sought an unreasonable royalty rate for such SEPs.64 Microsoft 
asserted that Motorola’s terms violated its FRAND undertaking with the 
SSOs because the expected royalties were unreasonable.65 Microsoft 
                                                
62 See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he legal principles for an injunction . . . supply no per se rule either 
favoring or proscribing injunctions for patents in any setting, let alone the 
heightened complexity of standardized technology.”). 
63 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at 
*2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Microsoft v. Motorola, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 
1098 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 
2012 WL 1669676, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing issues arising from 
the discussed license).  
64 Microsoft Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.  
65 Id. 
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asserted these grounds as a third party beneficiary.66  The complaint from 
Microsoft caused Motorola to file a suit against Microsoft alleging patent 
infringement.67  
In March 2013, Judge Robart of the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington dismissed Motorola’s claim for an 
injunction and ruled that Motorola’s FRAND commitments created an 
enforceable contract, and Microsoft, being a third-party beneficiary, had 
the right to sue for a breach of that contract.68 After refusing to issue an 
injunction, Judge Robart reset the royalty rates Motorola was charging 
for their SEPs, rather than force Motorola to settle on a new FRAND 
agreement.69 The new rates, issued by Judge Robart in April 2013, 
remain one of the first examples of a calculation of FRAND royalty rates 
for a SEP by the court, and will provide guidance for other SEP holders 
and their potential licensees when it comes to negotiating FRAND rates 
and terms.  
The court’s decision is distinctive in that it left the FRAND 
commitments unaltered while tailoring the payable royalty rates. In 
arriving at an acceptable rate of royalty, the court used the factors 
enunciated in the Georgia Pacific decision which enumerates a non-
exhaustive list of fifteen factors in the context of assessment of damages 
for patent infringement.70 Such factors include the royalty already 
received by the patentee, the rates that the licensee paid for other patents, 
the nature and scope of the license, the parties’ commercial relationship, 
the duration, the term of the patent, the advantage of using the patent, the 
profit proportion from the use of the patent, etc.71  
                                                
66 See id. (Microsoft asserted that it was a third party on the basis of its contract 
with the standard setting organization); see also Microsoft  Corp v. Motorola 
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (discussing lower court’s 
decision holding that Microsoft could sue as third party beneficiary). 
67 On November 9, 2010, Motorola initiated an action in the Western District of 
Wisconsin, which was subsequently transferred, wherein Motorola alleged that 
Microsoft infringed Motorola-owned U.S. Patent Nos. 7,310,374; 7,310,375; 
and 7,310,376. See Microsoft Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.  
68 Id. 
69 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (denying summary judgment for both parties); see also Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *101 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates).   
70 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v US. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
71 Id. at 1120; see also Florian Mueller, A Closer Look at the 207-Page, 
Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, FOSS 
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Using these factors, Judge Robart’s court determined the amount 
Microsoft would pay for all SEPs, and then proceeded by comparing this 
amount to the portion of it attributable to Motorola’s patents.72 In this 
analysis, Judge Robart confronted the possibility of royalty stacking 
which happens when there are several SEPs owners in play.73 Hence, 
Judge Robart determined the royalty rate and range with reference to 
comparable licenses concerning pooled patents in a single package. The 
new FRAND rates that were set by the court for Motorola’s SEPs were 
notably lower than the royalty rates initially offered to Microsoft. 
Motorola originally offered to license the SEPs to Microsoft at a rate of 
2.25% of the end-product price, which translated into a range that fell 
between $3.00 and $5.13 per unit.74 Judge Robart’s calculations set a 
FRAND range between 0.555 and 16.389 cents per unit for video coding 
SEPs, and a range of 0.8 to 19.5 cents per unit for wireless networking 
SEPs.75  
After the district court’s judgment, Microsoft sought a summary 
judgment on the grounds that Motorola breached the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, which is part of the RAND commitment.76 In 
response, the court pointed out that when a patentee’s interest in merely 
seeks injunctive relief per se does not as “[a] matter of law violate[] the 
duty of good faith.77 “Whether seeking injunctive relief for a SEP 
frustrates the purpose of the contract is based on the specific 
circumstances of the case, and here [licensee] has failed to carry its 
burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that a specific action by [ ] 
                                                                                                         
PATENTS (April 28, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/a-closer-look-
at-207-page-landmark.html (discussing the impact of Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola). 
72 See Microsoft Corp., No. C10-1823 JLR , 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash, 
Apr. 25, 2013), at *95. 
73 Id. at *72. The concept of royalty stacking occurs when a single product 
infringes on many patents or requires licenses from multiple patent holders. 
Such “royalty stacking” can result in a hold-up on the patent and prevent the 
patent from being manufactured and sold.  
74 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012); see also David Long, Ninth Circuit affirms Judge Robart’s RAND 
decision (Microsoft v. Motorola), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (July 31, 2015), 
available at http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2015/07/ninth-circuit-affirms-
judge-robarts-rand-decision-microsoft-v-motorola/ (July 31, 2015). 
75 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, 
at p. 207 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates). 
76 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (W.D. Wash. 
2013). 
77 Id. at 1187. 
101 FRAND V. COMPULSORY LICENSING [Vol. 14 
 
 
 
in seeking injunctive relief violated its duty of good faith.”78 When the 
motion was denied, the case proceeded to the jury. 79 Later, a federal jury 
in Seattle ruled that Motorola owed Microsoft $14.5 million in damages 
for breaching its FRAND obligation on the SEPs in question.80  
Meanwhile, the Georgia-Pacific factors have been cited in other 
cases as an important guide-post, when duly modified, to calculate 
FRAND royalty rates.81 The final word on the use of these factors for 
SEP patents has come from the Federal Circuit as part of its decision in 
Ericsson v. D-Link, wherein Ericsson accused D-Link, in 2010, of 
infringing a set of its 802.11 SEPs which were essential for the Wi-Fi 
standard.82 At the outset the court held that there is no Georgia-Pacific-
like list of factors that district courts can “parrot” for every case 
involving RAND-encumbered patents.83  Instead, the court held that 
district courts must carefully ensure to instruct the jury only on factors 
that are relevant to the specific case at issue. 84  Thus, jury instructions 
from the district court to consider damages for RAND commitments 
should be specifically tied to the RAND commitment that is at issue. 
Further, courts must be cautious not to instruct the jury on  factors that 
are irrelevant to the question presented at trial.85  Further, the appellate 
court held that it is the duty of district courts to clarify to the jury that 
any royalty award must be based on the incremental value of the 
invention and it cannot be based on the value of the standard as a whole 
or any increased value the patented feature gains from its inclusion in the 
standard.86 The court also concluded that, if an accused infringer wants 
an instruction on patent hold-up and royalty stacking, it must provide 
adequate evidence to that effect in relation to both the RAND 
                                                
78 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
79 See, e.g., Microsoft v. Motorola, Inc., ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG, 
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/lawsuit/microsoft-v-motorola-inc-2/ (last 
visited June 4, 2015). 
80 Steven Musil, Microsoft Awarded $14.5M in Motorola Patent Licensing Suit, 
CNET (Sept. 4, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/microsoft-awarded-
14-5m-in-motorola-patent-licensing-suit/.  
81 See e.g., Ericsson Inc., v. D-Link Systems, 773 F. 3d. 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Varian 
Medical Sys., 561 Fed. App’x. 934, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Whiteserve, LLC v. 
Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 27-29 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
82 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the Georgia-Pacific factors).  
83 Id. at 1230. 
84 Id. at 1231. 
85 Id.at 1226 (emphasis omitted). 
86 Id. 
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commitment at issue as  well as the specific technology referenced 
therein.87  This decision is in line with the Federal Circuit’s general 
hesitancy to adopt per se rules for RAND commitments reflected earlier 
in the Apple v. Motorola ruling discussed in the following pages.88 In 
avoiding a per se rule, the decision tends to favor the patentee89 and will 
become a guidepost for SEP holders and possible licensees to use when 
negotiating licensing and royalty rates on FRAND terms.90  
These cases demonstrate that royalty rates can be (re)set through 
judicial intervention rather than forcing a renegotiation of FRAND 
terms.91 Further, they also demonstrate the successful use of a breach of 
contract claim by interested licensees when a FRAND agreement is 
involved.92  
3. Award of Money Damages 
The restitutionary remedy for a breach of a FRAND contract is 
the awarding of monetary damages with a view to ensure that the party in 
breach returns whatever he received from the non-breaching party.93 This 
remedy has its roots as a breach of contract claim and in the FRAND 
context its operation is unlike an injunction which can force parties to re-
negotiate.94 Without meaning to comment on the parameters used to 
calculate the damages, it is suffice to state that monetary damages are 
meant as restore the benefit of the breach to the plaintiff. Basically, when 
the presence of an injury has been established, courts award monetary 
                                                
87 Id. 
88 See generally Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
89 Long, supra note 10.  
90 See, e.g., Daniel A. DeVito et al., US District Court Issues First Decision 
Calculating a FRAND Royalty for Standards-Essential Patents, SKADDEN (Apr. 
29, 2013), http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-district-court-issues-first-
decision-calculating-frand-royalty-standard-essential-patent (discussing the 
impact of Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc.). 
91 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (resetting royalty rates).   
92 See, e.g., CLAUDE M. STERN, IMPACT OF MICROSOFT V. MOTOROLA 
ON FRAND LICENSING IN THE US, (2013), available at 
http://doritkorine.livecity.me/image/users/256043/ftp/my_files/Presentations/cla
ude%20Stern_pdf.pdf?id=13904618 (discussing the impact of Microsoft v. 
Motorola as well as the use of breach of contract claim). 
93 See Richard A. Epsteini & David J. Kappos, Legal Remedies For Patent 
Infringement: From General Principles To FRAND Obligations For Standard 
Essential Patents, 9(2) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 68 at 71 (2013).  
94 See id. at 72 (highlighting that injunctions, when combined with damages, can 
overstate the extent of plaintiff’s losses and discussing the competing interest 
that are considered to determine the type of damages when there is a breach). 
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damages to the injured party as a matter of restitution.95 For instance, 35 
U.S.C. § 284 provides that “upon finding for the claimant the court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as 
fixed by the court.”96  
The mechanism of calculation of damages notwithstanding, the 
question with respect to monetary damages is whether harm to the patent 
owner has to be specifically proved.97 In other words, the issue is 
whether a patentee can be entitled to monetary relief or royalty—which 
is much more than nominal damages—if the patentee is able to prove 
infringement but unable to prove harm.98 For instance, Motorola, as part 
of its dispute with Apple, filed a complaint with the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Apple of six 
Motorola SEPs.99 Motorola petitioned to the ITC to prevent Apple from 
importing infringing products into the United States.100 In response, 
Apple filed a counterclaim and sued Motorola for failing to offer its 
SEPs on FRAND terms, and additionally claimed that Motorola 
infringed some of Apple’s patents.101 That is, Apple claimed that 
Motorola’s Android phones are copies of the iPhone “as a whole.”102 
Judge Posner, sitting by designation on the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois,103 determined that neither party was able to 
show incurrence of damages or of infringement.104 The court noted that 
“Motorola’s desire to sell products that compete with the iPhone is a 
separate harm—and a perfectly legal one—from any harm caused by 
patent infringement.”105 In essence, he asserted that Apple had failed to 
                                                
95 See id. (discussing the issues relating to calculating damages in the FRAND 
context).   
96 35 U.S.C § 284 (2012). 
97 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). 
98 Id.  
99 See Motorola Mobility, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 553 Fed. Appx. 971(Fed. 
Cir. 2014).  
100 See id. at 972 (discussing the Commission’s decision to deny Motorola’s 
petition). 
101 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d. at 920. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 904. 
104 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Why Judge Posner Pulled the 
Pug on Apple v. Motorola, FORTUNE (June 23, 2012), http://tech.fortune. 
cnn.com/2012/06/23/why-judge-posner-pulled-the-plug-on-apple-v-motorola/ 
(discussing Posner’s decision in Apple v. Motorola). 
105 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 920.  
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show incurrence of damages, as Motorola’s actions amounted to healthy 
competition in the ICT market and was not a direct infringement of a 
SEP owned by Apple. Similarly, Motorola was also unable to prove that 
Apple violated its SEP patents. 106 Given this, the court noted that both 
parties are seeking “substantial royalty predicated on no showing of 
harm.”107 The court specifically “disp[elled] any impression that such 
relief—substantial ‘compensatory’ damages for no tangible injury—
would be proper…”108 Conversely, the court held that monetary damages 
would be a proper remedy when there is clear proof of infringement with 
harm.109  On appeal the Federal Circuit, in a split panel, established that a 
“fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a zero 
royalty award”110 and added that if the record does not include details of 
either party’s royalty estimate, the district-court as the fact-finder has a 
duty to consider what a reasonable royalty would be.111  
4. The International Trade Commission as an Alternate Forum 
Protecting the borders of a country against counterfeit goods is 
not only an important aspect of national IP law but also of trade law. 
Among other things, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930112 prohibits 
unfair competition from importation of foreign products that infringe 
valid U.S. IP rights, including patents, into the United States.113 To 
prevent importation of counterfeit goods and to adjudicate disputes 
arising therefrom, the Tariff Act of 1930 establishes the International 
Trade Commission (ITC).114 The ITC is an administrative body and a 
quasi-judicial federal agency with the power to investigate complaints of 
violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act. 115This section bans the 
importation of articles that infringe a valid United States patent, 
copyright, trademark, mask work, or design.116 Similarly, non-
manufacturing sectors are also protected if they are engaged in licensing 
                                                
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 909. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. at 909–10 (stating that reasonable royalties may be awarded when 
infringement is proved). 
110 See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
111 Id. at 1328. See also SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 
F.2d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed.Cir.1991). 
112 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
113 Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
114 See id. (giving the international trade commission the authority to investigate 
violations of the Tariff Act). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. § 1337(a)(2). 
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and research.117 Termed as a “domestic industry” requirement, the 
provision protects intellectual property owners if the threat or effect of 
importation of a product into the United States can destroy or 
substantially injure a domestic industry, or, prevent the establishment of 
an industry, or restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United 
States.118 When the ITC determines that the importation affects or can 
affect a domestic industry in the United States, it issues an exclusion 
order.119  
In the context of FRAND agreements, the patent owner has the 
option of approaching the ITC to obtain an exclusionary order preventing 
an alleged infringer from importing his product into the United States on 
the grounds that “domestic industries” are affected by the importation.120 
This order stands until resolution of any breach of contract claims or 
patent infringement suits concerning the importation.121 The exclusionary 
order creates the same effect as an injunction by pushing the alleged 
infringer to negotiate with the patent owner. Further, it is important to 
note that the status of the ITC as an administrative body frees it from the 
bounds of judicial prescriptions like the tests outlined in the eBay 
decision.122 This position has been upheld by the Federal Circuit in 
Spansion, Inc. v. ITC.123 Consequently, it is relatively easy to get an 
exclusionary order from the ITC—a process that Professors Chien and 
Lemley assert is being extensively used by patent owners.124 The ITC, 
however, may refuse to grant an exclusionary order by considering 
consumer interest in the product at issue, as well as other public interest 
                                                
117 Id. § 1337(a)(3)(C).  
118 Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A). 
119 Id. § 1337(d)(2). 
120 Brian T. Yeh, Availability of Injunctive Relief for Standard-Essential Patent 
Holders, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 7-5700 at 7. 
121 Gary M. Hanth, General Exclusion Orders Under Section 337, 25 NW. J. 
INT'L L. & BUS. 349, 361 (2005); see also VastFame Camera, Ltd. v. Int'l Trade 
Comm'n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that the ITC 
exclusion order cannot be subject to collateral attack).  
122 See Understanding Investigations Of Intellectual Property Infringement And 
Other Unfair Practices In Import Trade (Section 337), USITC, available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm (“Section 337 investigations 
require formal evidentiary hearings in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.). The hearings are held before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).”); see also Standards, FRAND, NPEs & 
Injunctions Conference: Final Part, IPKAT (Nov. 7, 2013) available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.in/2013/11/standards-frand-npes-injunctions_7.html.  
123 Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
124 Chein & Lemley, supra note 50, at 3–4.  
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factors.125 Nevertheless, Professors Chein and Lemley claim that “[T]he 
ITC views enforcing patents as in the public interest, resulting in a thumb 
on the scale in favor of the patentee in public interest analyses” ”126 
In a recently released report, the Department of Justice along 
with the United States Patent and Trademarks Office (“USPTO “) urges 
the ITC to reconsider its use of exclusionary orders for SEPs whose 
owners have agreed to abide by FRAND licensing requirements.127 After 
all, a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusionary order 
would skew in favor of the patentee in a manner inapposite to the 
patentee’s FRAND commitment.  
5. Other Considerations Outside the U.S. 
The European Union presents an interesting study of how they 
deal with FRAND licensing and infringement issues. In May 2009, for 
example, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany (BGH) oversaw a case 
regarding CD-Rs.128 It held that an entity that infringes a patent only 
because it cannot obtain a license from the patent owner may defend 
itself by invoking the “abuse of dominant market position” defense.129 In 
effect, the BGH allowed an alleged infringer to defend itself by arguing 
that it is entitled a FRAND license under antitrust law.130  
Similarly, a FRAND defense was considered by a Japanese court 
in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics.131 In Japan’s Tokyo District Court, 
Samsung sued Apple for two cases of infringements on SEPs related to a 
wireless data packet system. The Tokyo District Court rejected 
Samsung’s claims on the grounds that Samsung had failed to comply 
                                                
125 See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 51.  
126 Chien & Lemley, supra note 50, at 20. 
127 POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 51. 
128 BGHZ KZR 39/06 (May 6, 2009). See also Rob Harrison, The Orange Book: 
The Relationship Between Patents and Standards, TANGIBLE IP (Jun. 11, 2009), 
http://www.tangible-ip.com/2009/the-orange-book-the-relationship-between-
patents-and-standards.htm. 
129 BGHZ KZR 39/06 (May 6, 2009). This decision has gained importance in the 
rest of EU as well. Article 82 of the European Commission Treaty deals with 
abuse of dominant market position.  
130 See, e.g., Anette Gartner & Thorsten Vormann, Federal Supreme Court Rules 
in Orange Book Standard, INT’L LAW OFFICE (May 26, 2009) available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=abc44bef-
50b0-4b0b-8c70-a28d7fa5502a (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).  
131 Heisei 23 (WA) 27941 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 2012); see also Tokyo High 
Court Publishes Apple v. Samsung Ruling, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Mar. 
30, 2014) http://www.worldipreview.com/news/tokyo-high-court-publishes-
apple-v-samsung-ruling.  
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with an agreement requiring it to license their SEPs on FRAND terms. 
Before the suit, the two parties had been negotiating a licensing 
agreement on a set of Samsung SEPs, and Samsung had offered a royalty 
rate of 5%. Apple argued that this was unreasonable and took the matter 
to court. When the court agreed with Apple, both parties renegotiated the 
FRAND agreement.132  
The interesting aspect of this decision is that the intellectual 
property policy of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
ETSI was used as a guideline in holding that Samsung had abused its 
market power, based on evidence of Samsung’s failure to fulfill its 
FRAND obligations pertaining to the SEPs. Additionally, the court 
acknowledged that Samsung, in maintaining its petition for a preliminary 
injunction, was abusing the legal process by delaying the disclosure of 
standards-essential patents to potential licensees. In the final ruling, the 
Japanese court also found that Samsung’s SEPs were unenforceable, and 
so Samsung could not claim monetary damages or injunctive relief.133 
C. The FRAND State of Affairs 
Currently, the diversity of remedies and the differences in the 
outcome that the choice of remedy can result in remains a concern. Using 
the court process to establish FRAND terms can cause a hold–up that 
increases the cost of a license, resulting in reduced efficiency. The 
alternative of raising a breach of contract claim is not necessarily a quick 
solution either. In any event, FRAND commitments differ on a case-by-
case basis, and hence, there are no standard terms or royalty rates for 
these contracts. Further, what may be a reasonable royalty rate in one 
case may be unreasonable in another. Given this, the target seems to be 
to generate a workable royalty range. Such a FRAND range may be 
applicable to any case regarding the same kind of device or standard. 
Working within a set range makes remedies easier to calculate, and can 
potentially lead to fewer disputes. In conclusion, although SSOs and 
FRAND licensing have the potential to be positive forces, they currently 
use up court time and result in muddied water for all parties involved, 
more so as FRAND licenses implicate more than one area of law such as 
patent infringement, antitrust and contractual issues. Further, as Judge 
Posner’s decision in Apple v. Motorola suggests, the cumbersome nature 
                                                
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Japanese Courts Rule Samsung Abusing FRAND Patent Process, 
ELECTRONISTA (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.electronista.com/articles/13 
/03/05/filing.made.public.by.apple.submission.of.ruling.to.itc/.  
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of litigation in our patent system is exacerbated by the current lack of a 
universal definition for the cost of patent infringement.134  
And then there is compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing 
bypasses the issues of FRAND licensing because the Government 
establishes a rate. That rate becomes the standard for licensing that 
invention. Although that rate may not be ideal, the benefit is that the rate 
is clearly defined up front. Further, the upfront determination of rates 
gives the parties information to take into consideration before 
implementing the standard in their products. The primary issue with 
compulsory licensing, however, arises when a patent owner that does not 
want to license its patent is forced to license. With this as the 
background, the next section discusses whether the compulsory license 
can be a solution to the problem presented by the FRAND license.  
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPULSORY LICENSING 
The monopoly component of any patent consists of the right to 
prevent competition and to charge a maximum market price. As a 
mechanism, compulsory licenses are meant to balance the patent owner’s 
right with the societal need for the product, and operate where public 
interest concerns outweigh the patent holders’ rights.135 Hence, such 
licenses affect the patentee’s monopoly. However, these licenses also 
represent a compromise between the complete revocation of patents on 
the one hand, and patentee’s absolute property rights over the invention 
on the other.136 Operationally, compulsory licenses can force an 
unwilling patentee to license the patent during the term of the patent.137 
They are therefore effectively involuntary contract[s] that are imposed by 
the state to achieve larger public objectives.138 Such licenses affect 
                                                
134 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
135 Rafael V. Baca, Compulsory Patent Licensing in Mexico in the 1990’s: The 
Aftermath of NAFTA and the 1991 Industrial Property Law, 35 IDEA 183, 184–
85 (1994); see also David J. Henry, MultiNational Practice in Determining 
Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses, 11J. INT’L L. & ECON. 325, 326-7 
(1977).  
136 Baca, supra note 135, at 184 (noting that compulsory licenses allow 
governments “to compensate for the economic shortcomings associated with not 
establishing a domestic industrial base when not working an invention within its 
borders).” Id. at 187. 
137 See generally Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the 
TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L.  L. REV. 941, 
945, 953–55 (2000).  
138 Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales 
and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349 (1993) (quoting PAUL K. GORECKI, 
REGULATING THE PRICE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY 
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market exclusivity and consequently, the market price.139 In theory, the 
incentive for encouraging innovation, which forms the central tenet of 
the patenting process, dictates that the price of a patented product cannot 
be controlled by a third party, including the government, unless licensed 
compulsorily.  
A. The Effects of Compulsory Licensing  
1. Access to consumers 
The issuance of a compulsory license has important effects. 
First, it ensures that consumers have access to the licensed products 
before the end of the patent term and at a price that makes it more 
accessible and less privileged. The issuance of a compulsory license 
usually is a rare occurrence in almost all countries. Most common 
instances of compulsory licensing are found in areas that are critical to 
public interest like energy sectors and pharmaceutical patents. A 
compulsory license involving a technology signifies an overwhelming 
need of the public for that patent to address an important issue that 
concerns the public. If there is a benefit from the compulsory license, it 
is the increased access that these types of licenses create.  
2. Effect on the rights of the patentee 
Next, it is presumed that the impact of the compulsory license is 
adversely felt by the patentee. Given this, compulsory licenses are 
viewed as disincentives adversely affecting inventors and patent 
holders.140 That is, patents serve as market incentives enabling patentees 
                                                                                                         
LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT 
PROGRAMMES (Economic Council of Canada 1981)). 
139 See Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for 
Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 402 n.260 (discussing the Department of 
Health and Human Services Reimbursement Board’s establishment of price 
limits at the lowest prices at which the drug is available). 
140 See Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of 
Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1291–92 (2001). For an example of 
judicial treatment of compulsory licensing, see Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), in which the Court outlined the 
traditional American posture on compulsory licensing. In considering whether 
the rights of a patent owner included the right not to put his inventions to 
manufacturing use, the Court recognized that exclusivity characterizes the 
absoluteness of the inventor’s property rights. Id. at 424. The patent in question, 
the Liddell patent, related to a paper bag machine. Id. at 406. After the patent 
was issued in 1896, the owner neither manufactured nor licensed the patent. Id. 
at 408. In 1908, the patent owner sued the defendant for infringement for 
manufacturing the patent. Id. at 406. The defendant alleged that the owner of an 
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to derive maximum economic efficiency from the market and this is 
irrespective of maximization of consumer welfare. The market incentive 
component is derived from the conception of patents as a private 
property that is gained in return for certain conditions, one of which is 
disclosure.141 That is, the inventor, among other things, reveals the 
invention in return for the government’s promise of a specified statutory 
monopoly on the production of the idea.142 Since competition is curtailed 
during the monopoly period, patent owners charge the highest price that 
the market can bear, typically far exceeding the marginal cost.143 
Presumably, the increased cost covers the investor’s past and future 
investments on research and development. Consumers, in turn, associate 
the higher cost for patented products with the privilege of using the 
invention.144 Hence developed nations, particularly the United States, 
believe that patent owners with valuable products will market them and 
discourage government interference with patent monopolies.145 In 
essence, the compulsory license is presumed to adversely affect the 
patentee in two ways. The first is the dismissal of the patentee’s right to 
refuse to license the patent; and the second is the reduced economic 
incentive for the patentee from the forced nature of these licenses.  
3. Government use of compulsory licenses 
While the general rule is that the patentees enjoy total monopoly 
during the patent term, proponents of compulsory licenses assert that the 
overall objective of the system is to serve the public, and that this is only 
satisfied when these licenses are appropriately deployed.146 
                                                                                                         
unused patent was limited in law from alleging infringement. Id. at 428.  
141 See Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 666, 674–76, 680–81 
(1998).  
142 Id. at 681. 
143 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1065–66 (1997) (“[P]roducers will price at marginal 
cost only if they are forced to by the existence of competition. A producer who 
controls a market will cut output and raise prices, increasing its profits but 
reducing both consumer and aggregate social welfare.”).  
144 Id. at 996 (discussing the privilege issue). 
145 See id; see also Fauver, supra note 142, at 677–78. Scholars have argued that 
compulsory licenses are unconstitutional since the grant of the exclusive patent 
right is unconditional. Id. at 678. Others have compared compulsory licenses to 
government appropriation under the takings jurisdiction, implying that patent 
rights cannot be restricted by compulsory licenses without just compensation. Id. 
146 Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. 
PA. L. REV. 378, 400 (1972); see also Fauver, supra note 142, at 681 (discussing 
why the United States views compulsory licenses as unnecessary). 
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Consequently, even countries like the United States that traditionally 
shun compulsory licenses use the mechanism where appropriate to 
achieve the overall goals of the system. Thus, provisions on compulsory 
licenses are not alien to the United States. For example, 28 USC § 1498 
empowers the United States government, or those authorized by it, to 
make any use or manufacture of a patented product or process “without 
license.” While the patent holder is entitled to “compensation,” he cannot 
enjoin the government from using it.147 Similarly, the Bayh-Dole Act148 
requires patent holders to use their invention for public benefit if the 
underlying research was funded by federal agencies. Under this Act, the 
federal government retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-
free license to use the invention, and the federal agency that funded the 
research retains a “march in” right to compel a license. This includes the 
right to “alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably 
satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees.”149 Similarly, the 
Clean Air Act allows compulsorily licensing of a technology funded by 
U.S. government grants in certain circumstances.150  
Further, U.S. law also allows compulsory licenses for promoting 
domestic economic objectives. For instance, the Energy Storage 
Competitiveness Act allows the government to require licensing of 
patents to “advance the capability of the United States to successfully 
compete in global energy storage markets.”151 This arises when the 
public’s need for the technology overweighs the need for the patentee’s 
monopoly right. The fact that such provisions relate to several 
technologies demonstrates that public interest issues can arise in different 
situations concerning those technologies.  
4. Economic incentive and compulsory licenses 
As for the concern that compulsory licenses serves as a 
disincentive, while the patentee loses the right to determine the price of 
the product for the market, the assumption that it results in an economic 
loss or even a real loss of revenue is a not always correct. Recent 
                                                
147 28 U.S.C § 1498 (2012). 
148 35 U.S.C § 200. 
149 Id.  
150 There are other examples of limitations and exceptions to patent rights in 
U.S. law including the Bolar provision outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which 
states that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products." 
151 42 U.S.C. § 17231(h)(7). 
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instances have demonstrated that the patentee can actually enjoy greater 
profits from the increased sales following the licensing of the product. 
For instance, when Bayer’s patent on Nexavir was subject to a 
compulsory license in India, it resulted in much higher volume sales of 
the drug in the country generating higher revenue and increased access. 
152 The increased sales volume offset any revenue losses that Bayer 
suffered from the license.153 Compulsory licensing the patent resulted in 
a steady stream of revenue given the wider access that becomes possible 
when these licenses are deployed.  
Additionally, the effect of compulsory licensing on the concept 
of incentivization is changing as property rights become more widely 
acknowledged in several countries. That is, globalization has caused 
newer markets to open for companies with critical technologies. This 
market expansion increases the volume of sales of such technologies, and 
may lead to sufficient profits for the companies despite the lower price 
the compulsory license commands. As the sales for the patent increases, 
it tends to compensate for the reduction in the sale price of each unit.  In 
all, despite the compulsory license, the presence of a bigger market can 
preserve the patentee’s incentive component. Further, it can serve as a 
way to provide needed technology to those markets that are otherwise 
unable to access such technologies.  
B. Examples of Historical and Contemporary Use of Compulsory 
Licensing Outside the United States 
Historically, compulsory licensing has been used by different 
governments to address various national issues. The origin of 
compulsory licensing precedents can be traced to the French law of 1791 
which was later adopted by many European countries as a mechanism to 
encourage local working of inventions.154 Similarly, the British 
government appointed the Sir Edward Fry Committee in 1901 to analyze 
the link between compulsory licensing and industrial production.155 In 
1907, Mr. Lloyd George, President of the Board of Trade, successfully 
introduced a bill incorporating compulsory licensing provisions in the 
House of Commons by highlighting that foreigners owned 6500 out of 
                                                
152 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2009) LPA 443 (India).  
153 See, e.g., Representation by Mr. D.G. Shah, Trade, Investment and Industrial 
Policies in India: Effects of the US Economy, Inv. No. 332-543, 
USITC Pub. [4501 2] (Jan. 2014) (Final) available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4501_2.pdf. 
154 N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS 
LAW 50 (1959). 
155 Id. 
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14,700 patents issued in 1906 and worked them outside of England.156 
Consequently, compulsory licensing provisions were introduced in the 
British patents legislation.157  
In contemporary times, India’s compulsory licensing provisions 
have been the focus of attention. Under the Indian patent legislation, the 
government could, in the public interest, interfere with patent rights and 
compulsorily license the patent.158 Patented inventions that were either 
not reasonably priced or were not worked to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public could be subject to compulsory licensing.159 In 
turn, the reasonable requirements of the public were deemed unsatisfied 
if the invention was not worked in India, if an existing or proposed trade 
was prejudiced, if the demand for the product was not adequately met, or 
if the local working of the invention was prejudiced due to 
importation.160 Of these grounds, the local working requirement has been 
the most contentious on the grounds that it discriminates against foreign 
manufacturers, especially in the context of pharmaceuticals. The same 
requirement has been present in Article 68 of Brazil’s patent law, under 
which anti-competitive practices, failure to locally manufacture, and 
intentionally failing to satisfy the demands of the market can all serve as 
a basis for compulsory licensing. 161 
Recently, India has been one of the few countries that have taken 
the bold step of working the compulsory licensing provision to create 
access to patented medication. In India, Cipla, a generic drug company 
asserted that the reasonable needs of the Indian public were not being 
satisfied because a certain patented drug, Sorenefib,162  was priced out of 
access of the several thousand patients living in the country.163 Cipla, the 
generic drug company, filed a petition to have Soranefib covered by a 
compulsory license. When the Controller General of the Indian patent 
                                                
156 Id. at 53. 
157 Id. 
158 Indian Patents Act, 1970 (as amended in 2005), 27 India A.I.R. Manual 450, 
§ 84, 90 (1979). The controller of patents compulsorily licenses the patent 
considering the nature of the invention and the applicant’s ability to work the 
invention to the public’s advantage. Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. § 90(a). 
161 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW, Lei No. 9.279/96, de 14 de maia 
de 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL D de 15.05.1996 (1996), available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/int_prop/nat_leg/Brazil/ENG/L9279eA.asp [hereinafter 
IPLB]. 
162 Soranefib is manufactured by Bayer, Inc. See Bayer Corp.Corporation Order 
No. 223 of 2012 IPAB, Chennai, (2012). 
163 Id. at ¶ 3.  
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office examined the petition, it was found that although India contained 
approximately 20,000 patients with liver cancer and about 9,000 patients 
with kidney cancer in the years 2008 to 2010, a negligible amount of 
Sorafenib was imported into India for sale by Bayer. In fact, no 
importation ensued in 2008 – a year when Bayer recorded a worldwide 
profit of over $678 million dollars in the rest of the world.  
To the Controller concluded that the patentee was not catering to 
the demands of the market, which is an important statutory criterion to 
avoid a compulsory license, and further, that the reasonable expectations 
of the public was not being met. Further, the Controller concluded that 
the drug was unreasonably priced at Rs. 2,000,000 ($ 5,000 
approximately) per month in a country where the World Bank reported 
that more than 25% of the population earned less than a dollar a day. 
Consequently, the Controller granted the request for compulsory license.  
On appeal, this license was sustained by the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board of India. Importantly, the appellate body raised the rate 
of royalty that was originally set by the Controller.  
One important feature of this license was that the government 
negotiated the rate and access was made available immediately once the 
appeal process was completed. Interestingly, the concern over economic 
cost of litigation and the associated costs of the patent holder pursuing a 
variety of remedies remains less with a compulsory license with 
compared with the FRAND regime. Additionally, the ends of the system, 
being access and the duty of the patentee to meet the societal expectation 
in return for the benefitting from the monopoly rights are predominant 
considerations in a compulsory licensing regime – a consideration that 
the FRAND regime is now being accused of allegedly lacking.  
C. Compulsory Licensing in International Agreements 
Internationally, the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPS) incorporates the Paris Convention on Industrial 
Property and expressly authorizes the use of compulsory licenses as a 
limitation of the rights of the patent owner under certain terms and 
conditions.164 TRIPS outlines the use of the compulsory licenses under 
                                                
164 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, 
World Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 
(1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) at Art. 
31 (hereinafter, TRIPS Agreement). See also Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 
307 (last revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].  
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Article 31.165 Most importantly, the compulsory licensing of a patent 
shall be authorized by the government or third parties authorized by the 
government. Further, each compulsory license shall be individually 
authorized based on need for the country and by following proper 
procedures.  
One such procedure is for the government to attempt to negotiate 
with the patent holder for licensing the patent on commercially 
reasonable terms. The term commercial reasonableness is to be weighed 
in the context of national need and not a reference to the highest 
marketable price.  Indeed, Article 31 (h) requires that the adequacy of the 
remuneration be measured by taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization. Similarly, the compulsory license will cease once the 
need ceases to exist. The need for prior negotiations with a view to 
compulsorily license (“prior negotiations”) can be dispensed with under 
Article 31(b), “[i]n the case of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial 
use.”166 Similarly, prior negotiations are waived where such licenses are 
required to cure judicially determined anti-competitive practices under 
Article 31(k).167   
It is also worth noting that under the TRIPS Agreement such 
licenses should be non-exclusive and should be non-assignable. 
Essentially, this will allow the patent owner to continue to use the patent 
and will also prevent governments from misusing the patent. Other 
interesting aspects are that TRIPS pre-supposes that a compulsorily 
licensed use of the patent will be made predominantly for the supply of 
domestic market. Similarly, the agreement also subjects such licenses to 
judicial and other appropriate review mechanism to provide relief to 
aggrieved patentees.  Other than these enumerated criteria, the TRIPS 
agreement does not detail the reasons or the basis for issuing compulsory 
licenses.  
III. A COMPARISON BETWEEN COMPULSORY LICENSES AND 
FRAND LICENSES 
The following section compares the two types of licenses with a 
view to determine whether some of the disadvantages of the FRAND 
licenses can be remedied by the use of either the compulsory license or a 
hybrid of both of these types of licenses.  
                                                
165 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 165 at Art. 31. 
166 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 165 at Art 31 (b). 
167 Id. at Art 31 (k). 
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Of the two types of licenses, operationally compulsory licensing 
is much more efficient once the government determines the need for the 
license because the price negotiations cannot be contentious beyond a 
point. That said, the larger question is whether the compulsory nature of 
such licenses can work to discourage patent owners. The benefit is that 
the mere presence of compulsory licensing options will and can ensure 
that the patentee cannot use pricing or other strategies as a mechanism to 
hoard the product and create artificial demand. This benefit is important 
considering that FRAND licenses in the SEP context has remained 
inefficient because patentees tend to deploy pricing and other strategies 
to gain more market power and slow the pace of competition.  
One of the obvious big differences between the two types of 
license is the issuing authority. In the case of FRAND licenses, the 
certifying organizations determine that certain patents are essential to the 
technology and then the patent owner voluntarily commits to a FRAND 
license. In the case of a compulsory license, the government determines 
that the need of the public for the patent overweighs the patentee’s rights 
to exploit it commercially, and then the government dictates the market 
price. With the ICT patents, the SSO determines that a patent should be 
licensed as an SEP just like how the government determines that a patent 
is critical to public welfare. But once it is determined that the patent is 
critical to public welfare, compulsory licenses become more of a 
regulatory mechanism where the government interferes to make 
corrections. However, with FRAND licenses, it is the owner who 
determines the price and thus, the market mechanism defines the 
licensing price of the patent. That said, both of these types of license 
achieve the same result of directly or indirectly prevailing on the owner 
to license the patent to third parties. In the case of compulsory licensing, 
having the governments negotiate the value may also be perceived as 
being disadvantageous to the patent owner in that the bargaining parities 
may be pitted against the patent owner.  
Compulsory licenses though remove the biggest debilitating 
factor of the FRAND license: the royalty negotiation. The rates are pre-
set in the case of compulsory licenses and most often, these rates are 
determined after negotiation with the patent owner. The determination of 
rates at the beginning of the process leads to a certain level of stability 
for users of the technology. In software patent terms, once a patent is 
deemed essential, having a negotiated rate will not only help the potential 
licensees but also the end-users of the technology. It reduces the cost and 
inefficiencies involved with litigation. Similarly, it reduces the 
opportunities to engage in protracted negotiations to arrive at a royalty 
range or rate, which improves the efficiency of the system by allowing 
parties to come to terms more quickly. The possibility of creating patent 
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hold-up becomes minimal with compulsory licenses. Hopefully, the 
possibility of increased returns from the market will minimize the barrier 
to innovate further over the technology and contributes to the progressive 
goals of the system. Interestingly, in early 2015, the IEEE is now in the 
process of revising its policies pertaining to the assessment of royalties. 
That is, the standard setting body is essentially revising its policies such 
that the royalty for an SEP that is used in a device will be determined 
based on the SEP’s value to the component as opposed to the whole 
product, which is the norm.168 Interestingly, the Justice Department has 
found this to have the potential to be pro-competitive.169 This 
development takes the form of FRAND licenses even closer to a hybrid 
of compulsory licenses, which this paper ultimately proposes.  Instead of 
the government, the SSO as the standards body imposes rules that pre-set 
the royalty range thereby imposing some limits but increasing the clarity 
for the patent owner as well as the licensee. This is indeed closer to what 
Judge Robart sought to accomplish in the decision discussed above. One 
of the biggest criticisms with the FRAND licenses is that it has resulted 
in SEPs becoming a tool to gain business strength between competitors 
rather than a tool to innovate. For example, Google’s purchase of the 
Motorola mobility’s patents is cited as a defensive acquisition. That is, 
Google was accused of using Oracle’s Java in an infringing manner in its 
android technology. Motorola’s patent portfolio, which Google acquired, 
consisted of patents on networking and video encoding which created a 
defense for Google to counter-allege that Oracle was infringing on some 
of Google’s patents.  When Google acquired Motorola’s patents similar 
suspicions caused the Justice Department to announce an investigation to 
determine the presence of any prevailing abuse of the involved SEPs.170 
A compulsory license regime will largely eliminate such issues that 
plague the SEPs by being more consumer friendly.  
While the above narrative compared both of these forms of 
licenses, this paper asserts that a more workable model would be a 
hybrid of these licenses that operates to eliminate some of the 
debilitating constraints of FRAND licenses. The authors are mindful that 
the structure presented may be a bit simplistic.  
                                                
168 Susan Decker & Ian King, Wi-Fi Inventors’ Cut of iPhone 
6 Sales to Shrink in Vote, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-02/wi-fi-inventors-cut-of-
iphone-6-sales-to-shrink-in-patent-vote. 
169 Id. 
 
170 See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 51. 
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1. The SSOs should continue to determine what type of 
patents represent a standard with respect to ICT 
patents.  
Once a patent becomes a standard, the patent owner 
should be able to license it on FRAND terms which, 
in turn, will become applicable to all licensees 
involved. 
2. In setting the FRAND terms, a standard royalty-
range should be negotiated with the patent owner by 
the SSOs. Such negotiation should resolve questions 
such as grant-back from the licensees, the patent 
owner’s right to seek an injunction and the 
circumstances for which such injunction can be 
sought and situations where dispute settlement can 
disrupt the licensee’s use of the technology. Thus, 
each of the SSOs should create standard FRAND 
licensing terms applicable to SEP licenses. 
Operationally, standardization of the FRAND 
licenses are not a new phenomenon; several 
organizations including the International 
Telecommunication Union, the Department of 
Justice, USPTO, Competition Policy International 
have already attempted standardization of FRAND 
licenses to reduce litigations.171 That of course, will 
take it closer to compulsory licensing, where the 
patentee has limited room to negotiate the terms of 
the license. Interestingly, at the time of this paper 
going to print, the IEEE was considering a proposal 
to change its intellectual property policy to 
streamline royalty determination. The new policy 
states the value of the patent holder’s royalty will be 
calculated from the value that the SEP adds to the 
“smallest saleable compliant implementation.” Thus 
the calculation of reasonable royalties will be based 
on the value of the SEP over the a) value of the 
                                                
171 See William New, ITU Undertakes Work on Standards Essential Patents, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct 12, 2012), http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/10/12/itu-
undertakes-work-on-standard-essential-patents/; see also Kühn et al., supra note 
18; Florian Mueller, UN Agency ITU to Hold High-Level Talks on Standard-
Essential Patent Litigation in October, FOSS PATENTS (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/07/un-agency-itu-to-hold-high-level-
talks.html. 
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functionality of the smallest saleable compliant 
implementation that uses the patent; b) in light of the 
value of the contributions of other SEPs and c) value 
of existing licenses, if any.172 Currently, we use the 
entire sale value of the product to calculate the 
royalty while this advocates a calculation based on 
the smallest saleable component.173 Allowing 
companies to limit the license to part of the SEP 
may also reduce litigations as patent owners cannot 
block the implementation of the product which can 
also leave patent-licensees with alternatives. 174A 
three to six month period should be allocated for 
potential licensees or interested parties to submit 
reasons to SSOs as to why a particular patent should 
benefit from a term that is different from the 
standard term or range. A resolution with SSO 
should result in the term becoming a part of the SSO 
agreement with the patent holder. 
3. In gist, an SEP patent should be offered by the SSO 
to various licensees on the same terms and 
conditions. Where a patent owner reneges on the 
standard terms and conditions, the SSO should have 
the ability to conduct a review of the patent as an 
SEP. Where the owner acts egregiously, the SSO 
should have the ability to seek patents from other 
members to create compatible standards.  The last 
suggestion would require a complete overhaul of the 
SSO system.  
                                                
172 David W. Long, IEEE’s Controversial Proposed Intellectual Property 
Rights (“IPR”) Policy Amendments, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2532ee11-365e-4161-8c2c-
69c0253badbf. 
173 The concept of Smallest Saleable patent component is a principle of evidence 
to avoid undue prejudice and confusion of jurors in jury trials. See Alexander L. 
Clemons, Beyond the Smallest Salable Unit, LANDSLIDE, 1–2 (2013), available 
at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kHGEO8ignlMJ:w 
ww.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/2014_may_june/A
BA_LAND_v006n05_beyond_the_smallest_salable_unit.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&c
t=clnk&gl=us (explaining courts use the smallest salable patent-practicing unit 
as an efficient way to value the patented feature in contrast to the unpatented 
features so as to calculate an appropriate royalty base, and that the evidence 
must be reliable and tangible, not conjectural or speculative).  
174 Decker & King, supra note 168. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is important to have an appropriate form of license that 
minimizes the technology hold-ups that are created when parties attempt 
to resolve differences. From a broader perspective, access to technology 
is an important element of the trade regime. In most nations, especially 
poorer nations, access to technology is important to achieve the 
objectives of the international trade regime outlined in Article 7 and 8 of 
the TRIPS agreement.175 For instance, Article 7 of TRIPS asserts the 
importance of “protection and enforcement of IP rights” to “national 
social and economic welfare of members.”176 The principles under which 
the objectives will be satisfied are outlined in Article 8, which recognizes 
members’ rights to adopt public interest or public health measures 
consistent with the TRIPS provisions.  
Indeed, lack of uniform access to technology creates the digital 
divide about which much has been written. Most literature on the digital 
divide highlights how such a lack of access exacerbates class divisions in 
countries like India and South Africa. This is because technological 
devices both increase connections between people, and provide 
opportunities to enhance one’s knowledge. Technologies have the ability 
to create power for the marginalized in a class based-society. Where 
access to such technology is limited to certain classes, it perpetuates and 
reinforces the class-based system that has caused much social and 
economic malaise. This is exactly what the international trade 
agreements hope to prevent.  
While we do not suggest that governments jump in and 
compulsorily license such technology, governments need not be 
bystanders while corporations use such technology as political tools to 
the detriment of its electorate. In poorer nations, a hybrid of FRAND and 
compulsory licenses that standardizes the royalty-ranges and other terms 
of the SEP license would not only lead to more technological access, it 
would also lead to more resources directed toward innovation. This 
would result in a more informed electorate and a more efficient system 
generally. While it is understandable that SSOs have limited authority 
over a patent owner with respect to the patent, a hybrid license that 
incorporates a component of standardized rates could eliminate some of 
these issues that are currently plaguing the FRAND licenses.  
 
                                                
175 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 165, at arts. 7, 8 (1994).  
176 Id. 
